Last week (11 December) I presented at Birmingham City University’s annual research conference, RESCON15. I was a part of an Ethnography panel organised by Jerome Turner of BCMCR so the focus here was on methods.
I talked about social media methods and argued for the value of more qualitative methods in social media research. I revealed some early insights from my interviews and the added insight they have brought to my social media research, and I also talked about the importance of considering platforms and their owners in any social media research.
The talk was kindly recorded and edited by Dylan Line of Multimedia Services at Birmingham City University, and my slides are embedded below the video.
I should also mention that I won 2nd prize in the poster competition, in which I presented a reworked version of my expertise poster. Thanks to everyone who voted for me!
So far in my PhD I’ve been referring to my potential participants as creative and cultural workers. This has been a ‘catch all’ way for me to give a rough indication of who I’m looking at, without committing to either creative or cultural workers. This is because, as I’ll discuss in this post, of the definitional ambiguities and confusion surrounding the terms ‘creative industries’ and ‘cultural industries’, which has implications for how I conceptualise ‘creative workers’ or ‘cultural workers’.
In a discussion of creative and cultural work, it is first neccessary to situate these terms within their wider context of ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ industries, so i’ll begin with a brief history of both terms, including differences and criticisms, before a discussion of ‘cultural ecologies’ which I think could be a helpful way of conceptualising contemporary cultural work.
The term ‘Cultural Industry’ is most associated with Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the mass production and mass consumption of cultural goods in the early 20th Century, and the absorption of culture into the economy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979). They argued that the ‘Culture Industry’ was a tool of the ruling class and the state over the masses. This industrialisation of culture partly arose from the technological advances of the early 20th century, and the autonomy of art was seemingly under threat. According to them, this led to resistance in the form of ‘bohemian’ lifestyle choices and ‘art for arts sake’. For me, this struggle between art and capitalism appears to have parallels with the notions of self-actualisation and aspiration for ‘meaningful work’ apparent in contemporary work (McRobbie, 1999; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005), and for artists, the tensions between art (art for arts sake) and commerce (making a living), persist (Hesmondhalgh, 2007).
As highlighted by scholars such as Sennett (1998) and Beck (2000) the emphasis on the ‘individual’ in modern work grew during the 1980s and 1990s as the decentralisation of work, which began with the Thatcher government, led to a proliferation of SMEs and freelancers. This also happened in the cultural industries, which became a particular object of policy during this time (Garnham, 1990). Reflexivity and entrepreneurship became important values in contemporary work, none more so than in the cultural industries. Lash and Urry (1994) pointed out how cultural workers possessed some of the traits which were valuable to the corporate sector, such ‘aesthetic reflexivity’ and an intuitive grasp of cultural trends. The inherent traits of cultural workers, particularly ‘creativity’, became more and more desirable in many sectors of work outside of the cultural industries (Ross, 2003) and this continues today with the encouragement of artistic interventions with businesses (Sköldberg, Woodilla and Antal, 2015). This emphasis on the artistic mentality and creativity took centre stage in UK cultural policy in the late 1990s.
The creation of the ‘creative industries’ as a policy object by New Labour in 1997 is what spawned much academic debate, centred around criticism of the term’s ambiguity, the emphasis on the knowledge economy and exploitation of intellectual property (Garnham, 2005) and the inclusion of software programming, video gaming, among many other industries not traditionally considered ‘cultural’ into classifications of the new ‘creative industries’, causing definitional confusion and slippages around culture, the economy and technology (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). These criticisms are usefully summarised by Galloway and Dunlop (2007), who argue that the ‘creative industries’ as a policy object obscures the distinctive aspects of cultural work, particularly the communication of symbolic ideas and meanings (p.27).
Many alternatives have been proposed since, a useful summary of which can be found in pages 22-25 UNESCO’s 2013 Creative Economy report. David Throsby (2001) proposed a model of the ‘core’ cultural industries (comprising of the more traditional arts) which extends to other cultural industries (including film and TV) and then to creative industries (advertising, marketing, PR). A similar model was proposed by the European Commission (2006). O’Connor (2010) argues that these models fail to take into account the complex processes and interdependencies within the cultural sector, “and evades some of the real tensions between creative labour and the conditions in which is it put to work” (p.57).
Such criticisms and debates are the reason why I’ve waited until I can dig more into the literature before working out what I mean by ‘creative and cultural workers’. In terms of choosing my participants, my instinct has always been towards people who work in what Throsby calls the traditional, ‘core’ cultural industries: “music, dance, theatre, literature, the visual arts, the crafts” (p.112) and so far these are the types of workers I have been approaching to participate in my research. This is because, in traditional terms, the creative practice which takes place within these categorisations doesn’t neccessarily involve digital technology and the internet as much as other, supposedly ‘non-traditional’ (as described by Throsby) cultural industries may do. So, for now I am referring to them as ‘cultural workers’ and the work they do ‘cultural work’. However, in order to avoid the separatist tendencies of the models described above, I’ve found John Holden’s idea of ‘Cultural Ecologies’ particularly helpful for conceptualising cultural work in a wider context.
John Holden’s (2015) concept of cultural ecology is based on Ann Markussen’s (2011:10) definition of the ecology of culture:
The complex interdependencies that shape the demand for and production of arts and cultural offerings.
The cultural ecology concentrates on relationships; between people, commercial and non-commercial organisations, professionals, amateurs, as well as the flows of ideas and money. It characterises cultural work as an activity only sometimes undertaken for profit, effectively accounting for consumer/amateur cultural production which has proliferated through digital and social media (Holden, 2015:12):
Cultural endeavour involves the making of meaning and the construction of social lives as well as (sometimes) the pursuit of profit. If culture is treated as an ecology, then the analytical approach becomes one of identifying cultural value, by taking into account the multifaceted and pluralistic value of culture beyond, as well as including, the economic.
Social media, the internet and mobile technology allow increasing opportunities for cultural production, co-production, self-branding, networking, and most of the work which goes into these activities is unpaid, what Terranova (2000) calls ‘free labour’. The increased capability of co-production and perceived blurring of distinctions between producer and consumer have led to what Andrew Keen (2007) and John Hartley (2009) have argued as an erosion of expertise in cultural life (as argued by Keen) and media work (argued by Hartley). This, however, needs much further investigation and interrogation and is a primary focus of my research in relation to expertise and how it is performed on social media. A talk yesterday by my supervisor Paul Long prompted further thinking about amateur cultural production and co-production which is emerging as an important theme in my research.
At the beginning of year two of my PhD, my research questions and focus have been refined since the outline I provided a year ago, so here is an up to date description of my research.
PhD title: The social media use of creative and cultural workers
Primary research questions:
- What is the role of social media in the everyday lives of creative and cultural workers?
- How is expertise performed on social media?
- What insights can both of these questions provide about the nature of contemporary creative and cultural work?
The conditions of creative and cultural work have long been a subject of critique and debate in creative industries scholarship, with concerns such as the precarious working patterns (Gill and Pratt, 2008), blurring between personal and professional life (McRobbie, 2002), and self-exploitation and labour (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2009) dominating these discussions. Similar concerns are being voiced around digital media use, including blurring between personal and professional life (Gregg, 2014) and digital labour and self-exploitation (Arvidsson, 2008). For creative workers using social media, are these extra concerns for them in addition to the pressures of creative and cultural work? How does social media use fit in with their everyday lives, and creative practice? How do they negotiate the potential tensions of social media use and their creative practice?
In the creative industries, being known as an expert is the goal in order to gain regular work; in the context of a growing ‘expert system’ in the UK creative industries (Prince, 2010) and with social media offering increased opportunities to promote yourself and your work, how does this manifest for creative industries workers? How is social media used by them to communicate and display their expertise?
My research will also contribute to knowledge and innovate in social media methodology. I am looking to use a multi-method approach, using interviews, social media analysis and a collaborative platform to capture social media and its role in everyday creative practice.
I’ve completed a full first draft of the literature review, and now my attention is on methodology and the actual fieldwork for this thesis. I do talk about method in my literature review – I have a chapter dedicated to social media methods and in this post I’ll talk a little bit about that, and think out loud about which methods to use to answer my research questions.
To recap, my research questions are:
- What is the role of social media in the everyday lives of creative and cultural workers?
- How is expertise performed on social media?
- What insights can both of these questions provide about the nature of contemporary creative and cultural work?
In my literature review I identified that practice theory and the philosophy of expertise are useful for conceptualising those first two questions respectively, and this is covered in my previous blog posts. My main argument from the literature review is that there is little work about the nature of contemporary creative work which explicitly considers social media use. In addition, social media offers opportunities for people to perform their expertise publicly, and in creative and cultural work where being known as an expert is more important than ever in a saturated and incredibly competitive job market, how do creative and cultural workers negotiate this on social media? What are the implications for their work/life balance and boundaries between personal and professional life?
A multi-method approach is required in order to answer these questions. For looking at the performance of expertise on social media, I have talked before about using the signalling expertise framework of Candace Jones for analysing social media posts and I think this can be helpful, as my pilot study has shown. Capturing the role of social media in the everyday lives of creative workers however is more complex. In taking a practices oriented approach I need to consider the various procedures and practices of these creative workers, not only in their social media practice but also their creative practice, and how it all interleaves together. Observation is the obvious route to take when looking at environments and institutions, but individuals? Won’t they be very aware of the researcher’s presence, and won’t they be a little self-conscious with the entire focus being on them?
This is where more creative methods are needed, in fact any research which looks at contemporary social worlds should be more experimental and reflexive, as argued by Law, Ruppert and Savage (2011) when talking about the social life of methods. They argue that our research methods are not only constituted by our social world, but also constitute it. This, as I mentioned in my previous post, could also be said of social media. People use social media to create things, perform expertise, express their views and opinions, etc. It takes work, time and effort. Yet people also use social media to catch up with friends, read news, watch videos, etc. They are experiencing aspects of the world through social media. So shouldn’t social media, somehow, also be used in the methods for exploring social media?
This doesn’t mean data mining or even analysing social media using frameworks such as signalling expertise. To truly consider the role of social media in the everyday, social media should be used, and I’m currently thinking through possible ways of doing this. How can this be done effectively, without being a waste of time for the researcher or extra work for the participants?
Since the last post I’ve been focusing much more on literature on expertise in the creative industries. Before I proceed with that however I should restate why I am looking at expertise.
One of the main research questions for my PhD is How is expertise performed on social media? Expertise, as I will demonstrate in my discussion in this blog post, is essential in order to progress and develop a career in the creative industries. Reputations are built on the expertise one has (or appears to have) and it is reputation that leads to more work. On social media, there are multiple opportunities for self-branding and self-promotion, and expertise, and the performance of expertise on social media, is yet to be explored among creative industries workers. What insights can this bring about social media in the life of the creative worker? What new insights can this bring about creative work?
Social network markets, expertise in the creative industries and reputation
In reading more around expertise in the creative industries, I’ve been led to the concept of social network markets, which I think could be a useful way of conceptualising the ideas of reputation and expertise and relating them to the wider context of the creative industries. According to Potts (2011):
“A social network market emerges when consumer choice shifts attention away from price information and toward observations of other agents’ choices as a rational reaction to uncertainties about product quality arising from novelty or complexity” (p.80).
The concept of social network markets has been used to look at the creative industries from a market-based perspective (Potts et al, 2008) and user co-creation online (Hartley, 2007; Banks 2009).
Banks (2009) looked at co creative expertise and the complexity of interrelations between “traditional expertise and emergent community knowledge structures” (p. 13). He proposes the analytical framework of social network markets to try and work through this complexity:
“This model of social network markets is based on the notion that this problem of co-creative expertise is neither an economic nor a cultural phenomenon in itself, but rather the outcome of a co-evolutionary dynamic between both economic and cultural considerations.” (p.13)
The framework of social network markets picks up on the economic and social aspects of the creative industries, which is useful for looking at ideas of reputation and expertise and relating it to the wider context of the creative industries. In Art Worlds, Becker (2008) articulates this social aspect in more depth in relation to the value of reputation in the creative industries. According to Becker, the term ‘Art World’ is used:
“To denote the network of people whose cooperative activity, organized via their joint knowledge of conventional means of doing things, produces the kind of art works that art world is noted for.” (xxiv).
Becker claims that reputation as a social process, and argues against the common tendency in policy discourse to emphasise the genius individual with a unique and rare talent (Bilton, 2010). Other people have as much to do with the value and reputation of a person or work of art, and it is this idea which is the base argument of Art Worlds. Becker emphasises the importance of consensus among peers and consumers, as well as the role of production and distribution systems, in forging a reputation. Becker’s account was written before social media and the internet, and so some of what he talks about with regards to distribution systems could be problematised in this context, for example:
“That writers do not achieve major reputations does not mean that no one is doing work that would, by the standards of those worlds, deserve such reputations, only that the world’s distribution system does not let participants know what they need to to make the comparisons that would allow credible judgments.” (p.363).
The internet and social media have made production and distribution of creative work much easier to do. Though it is still very difficult to gain the mass exposure that the larger media companies can generate, it is slightly easier to gain at least some form of exposure on sites such as YouTube. One also still has to rely on social networks (and a form of consensus) in order for their work to reach many people, and this aspect remains the same from Becker’s original account.
So even though anyone can now create something and publish it online, people still need to see it. This is where the importance of signalling expertise comes in, for getting one’s work noticed.
Expertise and signalling
Signalling is a way of communicating one’s expertise and building reputation, which leads to other forms of value, as Potts (2011) outlines:
“Credible signalling builds reputation, and reputation is social capital; a capital that is then fungible over future market and non-market contexts. Creative production occurs in a social context that gives rise to arbitrage opportunities over market and non-market spaces. The currency through which these transactions occur is not always monetary; indeed as often it is reputational, in the sense of being an investment in the wealth of a credible signal” (p.81).
Again, the internet and social media are worth considering in this context. How does the performance of expertise on social media play out here? Social media appears to be a ‘social context’ in which opportunities for creative production and distribution occur. What form does ‘signalling’ take here?
Candace Jones (2002) talks about signalling of expertise in the creative industries, utilising the work of Goffman to put together a theoretical framework to conceptualise signalling strategies. Again, there are ideas here which could be worth further exploration in a social media context. Jones talks about signalling content which consists of knowing why (identity), knowing how (performance) and knowing whom (relationships) (p.213) all of which are aspects of the online presence which I aim to explore in my own work (particularly performance).
She then talks about signalling strategies which are vitally important for reputation building. Reputation building strategies involve the types of relations someone pursues, and Jones talks about this using some of the terminology from Mark Granovetter’s strong and weak ties, claiming that strong ties dampen negative and amplify positive signals (and weak ties are more likely to invert that, i.e. amplifying negative signals). She also talks about reputation and self-presentation in terms of the audience and picking up ‘clues’ (using Goffman’s terminology) to best manage an impression. Again, these are ideas which are worth looking at on social media. A lot of work has been done on self-presentation online using Goffman’s framework, but not in terms of signalling of expertise.
Another interesting aspect which Jones mentions signalling as expertise – i.e. being an expert in signalling. Again, this is an idea which is worth exploring for my research in terms of social media usage. If you are highly competent, or expert, at using social media, does that make you appear more of an ‘expert’ in your creative field, because you are able to communicate it effectively online? What does this mean for peers who may not be so ‘expert’ at using social media? Jones claims that this practice of signalling as expertise involves analysis and intuition; intuition in particular is honed through experience. This idea of intuition has paralells with the ‘everydayness’ of expertise as talked about in my previous post.
If performance of expertise on social media becomes intuitive and natural for a practitioner, does that mean they are experts at social media, or experts in their field? What bearing does one have on the other in terms of time and effort invested into it?
Jones could have unpacked this idea of signalling as expertise further, however this is where I could pick up and explore in the context of social media use, particularly in treating it as a medium for communication and a part of creative workers’ everyday practice.
Banks, J. (2009). Co-creative expertise: Auran Games and Fury – A case study. Media International Australia, 130(February), pp. 77–89.
Becker, H. (2008) Art Worlds: 25th Anniversary Edition, updated and expanded. University of California Press.
Hartley, J. (2007). The evolution of the creative industries – Creative clusters , creative citizens and social network markets. Keynote address to Creative Industries Conference, Asia-Pacific Weeks, Berlin, September 2007.
Jones, C (2002) ‘Signaling expertise: how signals shape careers in the creative industries’ in M. Peiperl, M. Arthur and N. Anand, Eds Creativity: Explorations in the remaking of work. Oxford University Press, pp. 209-228.
Potts, J (2011) Creative industries and economic evolution. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Potts, J., Cunningham, S., Hartley, J., & Ormerod, P. (2008). Social network markets: a new definition of the creative industries. Journal of Cultural Economics, 32(3), pp. 167–18
I’ve been reading more about the philosophy of expertise and attempting to write more formally which is helping me to question and think things through. Below is what I’ve written as a continuation from my previous post about the legitimacy of expertise. This led me to work by Collins and Evans (2006). The work of Collins was critiqued by a BCU colleague, Mark Addis (2013), about which I will go into further depth below.
Collins and Evans (2006) problematise the legitimacy of expertise. They propose an adoption of SEE (Studies of Experience and Expertise) to conceptualise different categorisations of expertise, because they argue that specific scientific expertise should not be assumed to be legitimate, and that a consideration of other types of expertise, particularly what they like to call ‘experience based expertise’ (rather than Wynne’s (1991) ‘lay expertise’, a term they prefer to avoid) is required. They describe the ‘problem of extension’ – the extension of expertise outside of its core of specialist experts to those with more practice based (or ‘interactional’ expertise). The problem they pose is how far should participation in decision making extend? The authors focus on certified scientific expertise and their model of extension suggests that this is at the core, and is extended to those without formal certification but with specialist knowledge gained through experience. What about expertise in other fields outside of the sciences? Are they part of the ‘extension’ and peripheral to scientific expertise, or do they have their own core? Expertise in the arts, and creative and cultural industries, is likely to operate differently from the scientific, as the authors acknowledge using the judgement of the artist Tracy Emin’s ‘Bed’ as an example:
The appropriate group of judges, it was said, is not artists in general, nor even artists of the type who display their unmade beds (and the like) but art critics. […] this class of experts with ‘interactional expertise’ rather than ‘contributory expertise’. It may be one of the ways in which science and art are different.
(Collins and Evans, 2006:48)
Contributory expertise is what these authors associate with scientific expertise – contributing to knowledge. However, the authors suggest that ‘interactional expertise’ can be possessed instead of ‘contributory expertise’ which is not helpful, because it suggests that art critics can only have interactional expertise when this may not always be the case. Contributory expertise should not necessarily be confined to the sciences; only then can the problems of extension, and the problems of suitable reference points for expertise that the authors highlight, can be addressed. Every field, outside of the sciences, will have its own set of experts and reference points and each should be taken into account considering the context of that field. Addis (2013) highlights this lack of context in the model of ‘extension’ especially in regard to attempting to encompass everyday expertise:
Against Collins, it will be argued that the term ‘expertise’ should be reserved for expertise (esoteric experts) and exclude everyday performance (ubiquitous experts). Expertise is not ordinary competence or performance and extending the former so that it encompasses the latter is neither warranted nor enlightening.
Addis also argues that Collins’ work in SEE doesn’t take into account the thoughts of others in gaining expertise, which is important because the processes of gaining formal qualifications and certifications to become an ‘expert’ require some form of peer judgement, regardless of field. Addis, in work carried out with David Boyd (2011) on the expertise of construction workers, utilises the phenomenological account of expertise by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1986) to discuss skills acquisition. The five step model is better understood as a spectrum from novice to expert, and one moves along the spectrum through skills acquisition. When one then becomes ‘expert’ at something, it becomes a fluid and embodied performance, a part of the every day. Experts can respond quickly and intuitively to a variety of problems (Addis and Boyd, 2011) and offer reason – experts tend to “know how” rather than “know what” (Ryle, 1984). If we refer back to my previous post about legitimacy of expertise and what I quoted from De Certeau (1984) – he argues that the discourse of ‘knowing how’ rather than ‘knowing what’ (or what he calls knowledgeable discourse) is what is de-legitimising expertise. I’m finding that this tension between knowledge expertise and practical expertise is apparent in most expertise literature. The work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) addresses much more of the practical.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, who talk about expertise performance, use the term ‘performance’ in a way which is slightly different from how I have approached performance previously. They talk about performance as how one carries out a task, or their job, and their competence, or expertise with it, much like the performance of a car, or a bicycle, or a computer. However, people are not cars or bicycles, and though their approach is referred to by Addis and Boyd (2011) as ‘expertise-in-context’ (p.5), Selinger and Crease (2006) point out that the approach by Dreyfus and Dreyfus actually misses much context – as they explain in their critique of Hubert Dreyfus’s account:
The flaw in his assumption that skilled behaviour crystallises out of contextual sensitivity plus experience without contribution from individual or cultural biography can be traced to a failure to take into account that the embodied subject, even when behaving expertly, bring to the situation what has been historically and culturally transmitted to it.
(Selinger and Crease, 2006:228)
Selinger and Crease argue that expertise needs to be approached in a more culturally and contextually sensitive way, which is why I feel the use of the word ‘performance’ in this context of expert performance, should be problematised through my work.
When someone uses social media, how much do they think about it? The Dreyfus model suggests when one really needs to think about a task, they are nearer to the ‘novice’ end of the expertise spectrum. However, if they are thinking strategically about what to say, their audience, when to post, to bring the “greatest gain in social capital or professional reputation, at least cost to the individual” (Gilpin, 2011:244), that doesn’t make them a ‘novice’ by any means. Yet those who tend to tweet or post things, seemingly without thinking get into a lot of hot water, there are countless examples of this happening in many contexts. Does that make them an expert? Here I’m speaking in terms of the practical use of social media, and that alone illustrates how the traditional models of expertise can be problematised in the ‘social media age’. Use of the word ‘performance’ here has more to do with the Goffman-esque conception of presentation of self, rather than technical competence.
In addition, Dreyfus and Dreyfus talk about expertise and the everyday and how experts approach such complex tasks as easily as people do walking and other everyday activities. As Selinger and Crease point out, there are fundamental problems in terms of categorisation of experts and expert tasks:
On the one hand, he [Hubert Dreyfus] refers to people who are socially recognised as experts, such as airplane pilots, surgeons and chess masters, to illustrate how embodied expert performance functions […] on the other hand, he portrays mundane examples of everyday action, such as driving a car, walking, talking and carrying on a conversation, as paradigmatic instances of how experts behave, even though these activities would not normally be socially recognised as being performed by experts.
(Selinger and Crease, 2006:229)
The idea of expertise and the everyday is something I aim to unpack in my exploration of creative workers and their everyday use of social media. How much do they think about it? Both in terms of when and how they use it, and how conscious they are of ‘performance’? How does their everyday competence/expertise with social media (or not?) fit in with their everyday competence/expertise of their creative practice?
Though there is much to be learned from Selinger and Crease’s useful critique of the Dreyfus phenomenological approach, particularly their suggestion of expertise being looked at in a culturally as well as socially situated way, I suggest that the reflexivity of the individual should also be taken into account. Selinger and Crease agree with Dreyfus and Dreyfus on the assumption that the expert may not always have a complete cognitive grasp on their own expert behaviour, but how do we know this? Again, in my own research, where more conscious thought and strategy may be needed in order to perform expertise on social media, the reflexive process of the individual should be considered.
Addis, M (2013) Linguistic Competence and Expertise. Tacit Knowledge: New Theories and Practices 12(2) 2013.
Boyd, D. and Addis, M. (2011). Moving from knowledge management to expertise management: a problem of contexts [PDF] Available at http://www.bcu.ac.uk/_media/docs/CESR_Working_Paper_3_2011_Boyd.pdf
Collins and Evans (2006) The third wave of science studies: studies of expertise and experience in Selinger, E. And Crease, R.P.eds. The Philosophy of Expertise, pp.39-110
Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (1986). From Socrates to expert systems: The limits of calculative rationality (pp. 111-130). Springer Netherlands
De Certeau, M (1984) The Practice of Everyday life
Gilpin, D. R. (2011). Working the Twittersphere: Microblogging as professional identity construction. A networked self: Identity, community and culture on social network sites. New York: Routledge, 232-250.
Ryle, G. (1984). The concept of mind (1949). London: Hutchinson.
Selinger, E and Crease, R.P. (2006) Dreyfus on Expertise: the Limits of Phenomenological Analysis in Selinger, E. And Crease, R.P.eds. The Philosophy of Expertise, pp.39-110.
Wynne, B. (1991) “Sheep Farming after Chernobyl: a Case Study in Communicating Scientific Information,” in H. Bradby (ed.) Dirty Words: Writings on the History and Culture of Pollution, pp. 139–60. London: Earthscan.